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New Veiling in Azerbaijan
Gender and Globalized Islam
Farideh Heyat
LONDON AND BAKU
ABSTRACT In the past few years, the growing presence of veiled women in
Azerbaijan, particularly in the capital city, Baku, has been striking. This article
traces the background to Islamism in Azerbaijan under the state dogma of athe-
ism, and the post-Soviet changes that have facilitated a resurgence of religion in
the country. It examines the motivations and the generational divide among
women who have recently adopted veiling. Notions of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’
are questioned here, pointing out the impact of identity politics and foreign
Islamic forces on Azerbaijani society in today’s increasingly globalized world.
Furthermore, the article reveals the tensions and insecurities in the independent
era that have reinforced the rise of Islamic ideology in the country and the contra-
dictions involved in new veiling for Azeri women.
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One of the striking social changes of the past few years in Azerbaijan is
the increase in religious following, and the growing presence of veiled
women on the streets of Baku. On the surface, this indicates a return to
tradition and resurgence of Islamic belief and practices, in line with the
increasing global popularity of Islam. However, a closer examination
reveals many facets of the phenomenon in Azerbaijan that are at odds
with its 20th-century history of social development. Following the break-
down of the Soviet system, the country emerged from 70 years of atheis-
tic rule and various stages of modernization under a Communist regime
that brought mass employment, compulsory primary and secondary edu-
cation, and equality in law for women. More crucially, the unveiling of
women, a process that took a few decades to fully accomplish and
entailed great sacrifices by some of its pioneers in the 1920s, was embed-
ded in the collective psyche as a major achievement by the Soviet regime.
Today, in the centre of Baku, there remains the memorial statue of a
woman casting off her veil as she stands tall and proud looking into the
distant horizon.1
This article traces the background to Islamic following in Azerbaijan
under the state dogma of atheism, and the post-Soviet changes that have
facilitated resurgence of religion in the country. Despite decades of material
development and Soviet modernization, concepts of male superiority and
imposition of strict codes of morality on women remained at the core of eth-
nic Azeri identity. This article examines the generational divide among
women who have recently adopted veiling, their motivation in doing so
and their perception of it in terms of their status, liberation and empower-
ment. Notions of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ are questioned here, pointing
out the impact of identity politics and foreign Islamic forces on Azerbaijani
society in today’s increasingly globalized world. Furthermore, the article
reveals the tensions and insecurities in the independent era that have
reinforced the rise of Islamic ideology in the country and the contradictions
in Azeri women’s gender norms, and their rights and status.
The research for this article was conducted during June and July 2007.
There were 22 women interviewed in total, four of whom were the key
informants. These and other respondents for this research were selected
from my network of friends, acquaintances, contacts at Baku State
University, local women’s NGOs and from my neighbourhood in Baku.
An earlier research on the position of women in the southern region of
Azerbaijan, conducted for the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe, March–April 2006, forms part of the background to this study.
Azerbaijan is a country of 8 million, strategically situated between
Russia, Turkey and Iran. It shares a long history and most of its cultural
traditions with Iran. A far larger Azeri population in fact live south of the
border in Iran. The overwhelming majority of the population, around 95
percent, are Muslim. Shi’ism was the majority sect, especially strong in
the Baku region, and south of the country, near the Iranian border. The
Sunni population were traditionally scattered in the north and the west of
Azerbaijan. In recent years, the Shi’a–Sunni balance in the country, partic-
ularly in Baku, seems to have shifted in favour of Sunnism; Sunnis are
estimated to compose 35 percent and Shi’as 65 percent of the population.2
A recent survey of 600 young people in Baku (aged 16–35) further indi-
cates a rise in the number of Sunnis among the young.3 However, a major-
ity of respondents in this survey, 57 percent, considered themselves
Muslims without distinguishing between the two sects.
The weakening of the divide between Shi’a and Sunni faiths in
Azerbaijan has its roots in the long period of Soviet rule, when religious
practice was severely restricted. Consequently, in the makeshift mosques
and at home, the Shi’a and Sunni communities tended to integrate in their
practice of religion, whether in performing prayers, religious rituals or
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mourning ceremonies (yas) (Lemercier-Quelquejey, 1984). Furthermore,
under the Soviet system, with atheism as the official doctrine, the state
denied access to religious knowledge, which led to a loss of religiousness
(retaining religious knowledge) among the great majority of people. But
ironically, religiosity (using religion as an idiom, manifested in frequent
references to Allah and retaining strong religious sentiments) flourished.
This process of privatization of religion, driving it from the public arena
to the private realm of the home and kin group, and its consequent impact
on gender relations and expectations of womanhood have been discussed
for the Azerbaijanis (Heyat, 2002; Tohidi, 1996, 1997) and for the Tajiks
(Harris, 2004; Tett, 1994). In my book on Azeri women (Heyat, 2002), I
have discussed the dualistic system of education that evolved in the early
years of the Soviet regime in Azerbaijan, leading to a dichotomous
approach to religion by the individual; a case of ‘religious hearts and athe-
ist minds’ (Heyat, 2002: 140). Coming from a strong religious tradition,
Azeri children in the 1920s and 1930s were receiving atheist education at
school, while at home they were brought up by parents and grandparents
who observed Islamic mores and performed their religious duties.
Many women of mid-generation today (those over 50) still remember
their grandmothers wearing the large headscarves, kalaghe, performing
their daily prayers, namaz, fasting and attending the religious rituals
of marsiyeh.4
Along with religious practice in the home, a basic belief in God and
many religious concepts and mores were inculcated in the children of that
first generation. However, in the decades that followed the ban on reli-
gion, with the imposition of atheism and the growing interethnic mix
(socializing with Russians, Armenians and Georgians), many of the reli-
gious prescriptions and norms, such as those regarding dietary prohibi-
tions and gender relations, were weakened or eroded. Nevertheless, a
basic belief in God, or more precisely, the fear of Allah, remained in the
hearts and minds of the population. As a result, throughout the Soviet
period certain religious practices such as visiting shrines, ziyarat, paying
alms, nazir, and religious tax, fitre (paid at the end of Ramadan) remained
strong, even if the wording of namaz were forgotten and nobody fasted
any longer. The isolation of the Azerbaijani religious establishment from
its Shi’a sources of authority (in Iran and Iraq) also led to a confusion of
religious belief and folk practice. Consequently, as in Central Asia, reli-
gion and ethnicity formed complex and interchangeable frames of refer-
ence to which cultural norms and practices were ascribed in a fluid way
(Gross, 1992). Thus, being a Muslim and an Azerbaijani became synony-
mous, attributing many ethnic customs and cultural norms, including
aspects of gender relations and femininity, to being Muslim,
Musulmanchilik (Dragadze, 1994). Islam thus encompassed an identity
category far beyond religious belief and labelling.
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When the country gained its independence in 1991, it was against this
backdrop of ideological confusion and ignorance of religious knowledge
that the doors opened onto the outside world and increasing contact
began with the surrounding Muslim countries. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
states, with their huge resources and Islamizing agenda, Iran, with its
desire to promote political Islam and Shi’ism, and Turkey, with its grow-
ing Islamism, all entered the scene. Thus in the 1990s an increasing num-
ber of mosques and madrasahs were built and renovation of shrines and
old mosques took place. With the support of Saudi, Iranian and Iraqi gov-
ernments, pilgrimage trips to Mecca, and the holy Shi’ite sites in Iran
(Mashad) and Iraq were also facilitated.
The reaction of the Azerbaijani government to the influx of Islamist
groups and foreign religious organizations and charities, and their publi-
cations, was to initially adopt a completely open door policy. The political
turmoil in the country, war with Armenia and the resultant refugee situa-
tion were the major problems for the state. In the post-Soviet ideological
vacuum, identity politics in Azerbaijan, as in the other formerly Soviet
Muslim republics, promoted Islamic beliefs and practices. Christian
churches and missionary groups, as well as other denominations, also
began to proselytize, often through charitable activities.
But by the end of the 1990s, restrictions were introduced to curb the
activities of religious groups, requiring them to register officially. Two
official bodies took charge of their monitoring: the State Committee for
Religious Affairs and the Caucasus Muslim Board. The latter was headed
by the chief imam of the Taza Pir, the largest old mosque in Baku.
However, of the estimated 2000 different religious groups currently in
operation, only 347 have received registration. Those most under pressure
are the fringe groups not traditionally known in Azerbaijan, and the more
radical Muslim mosques. These include the Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses,
Hare Krishna and Wahhabi Muslim groups. Successive governments
have had a particularly difficult task to balance: on the one hand, the post-
Soviet craving for religious knowledge and spiritual fulfilment; on the
other, the fear that a militant Islamist group might become a source of
opposition, with the power to mobilize large numbers of people.
There was a warning of the latter in the disturbances in 2002, following
the government’s imposition of control over religious activity in the small
town of Nardaran, neighbouring Baku, in which one person was killed
and many injured.5 The harassment of the congregation of the historic
Juma mosque in Baku’s Old Town, whose imam had voiced political
ambitions, and his removal, was another indication of the state’s attempts
to quash discontent voiced by the fledgling autonomous Muslim estab-
lishment in Azerbaijan. However, political Islam has not as yet made any
significant inroads in the country. In the southern region, bordering Iran,
the Iranian attempts to radicalize the local population in the 1990s were
European Journal of Women’s Studies 15(4)364
met by stiff resistance from the local clergy and the authorities. Similarly,
much of the activities of the Wahhabi Islamist groups in the north of the
country, where the majority are Sunnis, were obstructed.6
The term ‘Islamist’ is often used indiscriminately in the West to refer to
religiously inspired political movements across the world who differ
vastly in their outlook on issues of democracy, human rights (including
women’s rights), the state and nationalism. Olivier Roy (1994), in his
major study of radical Islamism, points to its common call to fundamen-
talism, while at the same time, paradoxically, its attempts to integrate
modernity. Radical Islamists today, he argues (Roy, 1994: 79), attempt to
re-Islamize society at a grassroots level, with the aim of conquering it
through reform of mores centred on the return to individual religious
practice that will promote public virtue and maintain personal piety. This
line of thinking is very much evident among the Wahhabis/Salafists in
Azerbaijan, a Sunni sect rapidly growing among the educated young in
Baku. They adhere to the ideology of Salafiyya (return to ancestors), a
19th-century Muslim fundamentalist movement inspired by Muhammad
ibn Abdal-Wahhab. Their main centre is the Abu Bakr mosque in Baku,
established in 1998 with Kuwaiti funding and led by a charismatic young
Azeri imam, Gambet Suleymanov. He was educated in Medina in the
1990s, and is highly respected by his congregation for his intelligence and
his integrity. Today, this mosque attracts the largest congregation, with its
Friday prayers being attended by up to 10,000 men. Duval (1998) points
out that Salafi followers, prominent in Egypt, have synthesized action-
oriented Islamism with Sufism. They strive for social change through
self-discipline in purifying oneself from previous sins, which would then
reflect on the outside, and the whole society.
Similarly, Suleymanov preaches the need for individuals to start with
cleansing and purifying their inner self and gaining piety before they can
effect social change and deal with inequalities. They can then work on
their families, neighbours and friends. He states that the great attraction
of religion today is the inner peace and stability it offers. ‘The youth espe-
cially, are confused by all the changes and the social upheavals, globaliza-
tion, the problems with Karabakh [conflict with Armenia], and the
growing wealth gap. They feel disturbed and they are looking for ways to
calm their anxieties.’7 Suleymanov offers a rationalist view of religion dis-
tinct from traditional beliefs and practices (such as veneration of saints
and shrines and payment of alms in fulfilment of wishes) that is particu-
larly appealing to his educated and professional followers. In contrast, the
leadership of the main mosque in Baku, Taza Pir, are perceived as being
only interested in enriching themselves through religious donations and
commercial deals. For the young, educated women in Azerbaijan
impressed by the messages of Islamist movements, veiling is a public
expression of their new identity as socially responsible, pious individuals.
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NEW VEILING: INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVES AND
POLITICAL CHALLENGES
Studies of the new veiling phenomenon among various Muslim communi-
ties (Duval, 1998; Hessini, 1995; Jansen, 1998; El Guindi, 1999; Watson, 1994;
Yegenoglu, 1998) point to a number of common features. Most notably, this
is no return to old traditions of veiling and confinement of women to the
home environment, but a voluntary act of self-assertion in adopting a form
of dress that signals respectability (through an image of modesty and
chastity) while leading an active public life. In the case studies presented,
the women often refer to the greater degree of mobility in the public space
and freedom from male harassment they have enjoyed since adopting
Islamic dress. Hessini (1995), in her analysis of women wearing the hijab in
Morocco, points out the importance of division of space in Muslim commu-
nities and assumptions about differences between men and women that
underline the respect for veiled women among them. In effect, a veiled
woman in the public space is presumed to signal distance and unavailabil-
ity to unrelated males, thus warding off any unwanted approaches. This
aspect was also pointed out by my young informants who found being
veiled helpful in gaining permission from jealous husbands and possessive
parents to move more freely outside the home.
Ask and Tjomsland point out that today’s Islamic dress, far from being
traditional, ‘reflects innovation made by the younger generation of
women who use change of clothing to accentuate their identity and
response to a changing world, and thereby even create a resourceful place
for themselves within that world’ (Ask and Tjomsland, 1998: 11). Indeed,
the changes in form and meaning associated with the veil, and more
broadly women’s attire, in the 20th-century Middle East affirm its politi-
cal nature and its relation to identity politics of the region. The most
notable example here is perhaps the case of Iran where the traditional veil,
chador, was outmoded in the process of modernization under the Shah.
Then, by the end of his regime in 1979, a new modified form of veiling
was adopted by the revolutionary women protesting against his regime
and western imperialism in Iran (Azari, 1983). In recent years, the tide
has turned once more; women are in the forefront of resistance to the
theocratic regime, dressing in ways that are often considered un-Islamic,
badhijab.8
The ironies of the situation in Iran are not lost to Azerbaijanis, whose
country lies just across the border. In my recent discussions with various
groups of self-employed women in Baku (street vendors, beauticians,
tailors), they often remarked with surprise and irony that while so many
Iranian women tourists cannot wait to cast off their headscarves the
moment they arrive, some Azeri women are today voluntarily putting it
on. This was an issue that members of the largest women’s NGO in
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Azerbaijan, Women’s Rights Defence Committee, were particularly con-
cerned about. The head of the group, Novella Jafarova, who has been
campaigning for democracy and women’s rights in Azerbaijan since inde-
pendence, voiced the group’s concerns in an interview, as follows:
Ten years ago we really didn’t think religion and Islam were an issue or a
problem for our country. But today as we see all these recently veiled
women we begin to fear a fate such as that of women in Iran. We certainly
cannot afford to lose any of our gains from the Soviet era. But if we are not
careful, Islamism could creep up on us and we’ll all be pushed back under
the chador. 
The association between veiling and infringement of women’s rights
has not so far surfaced much in the public discourse in Azerbaijan, and
was not acknowledged by any of my veiled informants. As becomes clear
later in this analysis, equality under current laws (a legacy of the Soviet
system) is taken for granted and restrictions for women under the Sharia
law are dismissed as irrelevant by these women.
SHADES OF HIJAB: AZERI FEMININITY UNDER COVER
In Baku today there are a multitude of Islamic stores selling outfits for
women observing the hijab, as well as CDs and cassette tapes containing
religious lessons, sermons and Koranic readings. The long skirts, tunics
and headscarves on display are often as colourful and pretty in design as
the clothing sold in nearby fashion boutiques. The local understanding of
being veiled is to be covered head to foot, except for the face and hands,
though a great variety of styles are adopted, from a long, loose coat-type
dress to tight jeans and tops. The current notions of Islamic femininity,
requiring modesty, chaste demeanour and way of dress, were in fact
highly idealized feminine traits in Soviet Azerbaijan (Heyat, 2002: 194;
Tohidi, 1996). Even as late as 1992 (during my first visit to Azerbaijan), it
was extremely rare to see women in trousers or short skirts on the streets
of Baku. Furthermore, the ethnic Azeri culture under the Soviet system, as
with many other male-biased patriarchal cultures, assumed women’s pri-
mary responsibility to be the domestic care, and men’s, the financial
maintenance of the home. The present-day rise in religiosity and intrusion
of Islamist ideology into family life, therefore, does not create conflict or
tension in many aspects of everyday life. The traditional separation of
male and female space is still observed today, for example in the case of
mourning ceremonies (yas), or weddings (toy) in rural areas, and restau-
rants and cafes in provincial towns being a male domain.
Since the 1990s, with the oil boom, the presence of foreign companies
and NGOs and travel abroad, much of the social scene in Baku has
Heyat: New Veiling in Azerbaijan 367
changed dramatically (Heyat, 2006). Western cultural influences are para-
mount everywhere, beamed through the media (satellite, Turkish and
Russian TV channels), wide use of internet and student exchanges
abroad. Most young Azerbaijanis are indeed socially and culturally ori-
ented towards Europe and the US. Today, there are growing employment
opportunities for educated young women with a knowledge of western
languages, and greater autonomy for those with absent fathers and hus-
bands (mostly due to massive labour migration to Russia and elsewhere).
Young women appearing on their own, often dressed in revealing west-
ern fashion, is a common sight, and considered sexually provocative to
recent male migrants from rural regions. Some of these are refugees and
displaced persons in the war with Armenia, others have come in search of
employment and to escape poverty in the regions. The social upheavals of
the past 15 years, the prominence of money as the new arbiter of social
life, the astronomical rise in corruption and the display of permissiveness
in the media, have all led to a sense of insecurity and loss of morality in
society, for which some men and women consider religion as a panacea.
Gureyeva (2003), in her study of new veiling among women in Azerbaijan,
confirms this. All her respondents had pointed out that Islam and veiling had
empowered them by giving them a sense of stability and strength, and
helped them gain confidence in themselves and in their future. The accounts
of my key informants that follow elucidate similar points, while revealing the
contradictions in their status as independent women, and the gender norms
they were subject to requiring them to submit to male authority.
Laleh is a 19-year-old, third-year student of international relations at
Baku State University. Her only sibling, a younger sister still at school, has
not followed her example of veiling. Laleh presented herself to me as a
Sunni Muslim and a Salafi, arguing that Sunnism was ‘true’ Islam.
Shi’ism, the sect her family believed in, was a later invention, she said, ‘a
deviation from the original path’. Her parents are both university-edu-
cated professionals. According to Laleh, around 20 percent of the students
at her university are newly veiled. She, herself, had become interested in
religion during her last years at school when Islamic following was
becoming popular among her fellow pupils. Her family, however, dis-
played no interest in religion and when she decided to veil, her parents,
particularly her mother, were at first against it. It took many arguments to
convince them that she was making the right choice. Her grandfather had
been especially baffled to see her covered up. His generation had strug-
gled hard to cast off the veil. He had commented to her: ‘You look like
your great grandmother, why do you want to turn the clock back?’ The
establishment in Azerbaijan are generally unsympathetic to the idea of
veiling and suspicious of veiled women. Such women are subject to dis-
crimination in employment and have difficulty in obtaining passports
and identity cards (photographs of veiled women are rejected).
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In 2006, Laleh finally made up her mind to embark on veiling. She then
went with a former class mate to the main mosque near her home, the
Abu Bakr mosque in central Baku, and took her vows of repentance,
toabeh. Since then she has been attending the mosque at least once a week,
taking religious lessons and attending lectures by the imam. She also reg-
ularly visits Islamic websites that publish religious news and views in
Azeri and Russian language. She does her daily prayers, namaz, five times
a day in the Sunni tradition. ‘I am very happy now that I have made my
decision’, Laleh told me when we first discussed her recent religiosity. ‘I
feel pure and virtuous, and I get a lot of respect from men on the street.
On the bus and the metro, even older men get up and offer me their seat.’
Laleh’s cousin, 23-year-old Yasmin, was another recent born-again
Muslim who attended the Abu Bakr mosque. She had been very inspired
by Laleh’s study of Islam and religious devotion. She believed her to have
become more confident and articulate since then. Yasmin was married,
with a two-year-old son. She lived with her in-laws who were not reli-
gious and questioned her recent adoption of the veil. She had married her
husband at the end of her first year of university. He had turned out to be
very possessive and jealous of her outside movements. She had dropped
out of studying after her first year and had a baby. Now, since being
veiled, he seems more relaxed about it, so she has embarked on a new
course of study. He himself took up religious observance over the past
couple of years but found it difficult to keep up with. Yasmin’s brother, on
the other hand, is steadfast in observing his religious duties since his
toabeh three years ago, though he did not pressure her to wear the veil. But
now Yasmin and her brother are both encouraging their mother to take up
religion. They have often discussed with her the sinful ways in which
many people in Azerbaijan, especially the wealthy, live their lives, and
warned her of ghiyamet (Judgement Day) and the need to follow Allah’s
commands.
The fear of Allah and ghiyamet was also articulated by a number of my
other informants, such as Nigar, a 24-year-old doctor, who graduated a
year ago. She is married with no children, and is currently unemployed.
To get a job at a hospital she would need to pay a substantial bribe to the
chief consultant who then passes part of it to higher up authorities.9
Nigar’s family are all professional people, but not rich. She began praying
regularly and keeping fast four years ago. She would like to veil but is
wary of her mother and mother-in-law’s disapproval. She is also con-
cerned that it may prejudice her job opportunities. Her former class mate,
Gulnur, took up the veil a year ago, and has been a major influence on her.
But then she already had a job as a dentist at her brother’s private clinic.
Nigar’s husband, a graphic designer, has very recently started doing the
namaz, persuaded by her. He attends the Abu Bakr mosque for Friday
prayers, along with Gulnur’s brothers.
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Nigar estimated that around 15–20 percent of the female students at her
former university are veiled. She thinks that influences from Turkey are
partly responsible; students from provincial Turkey with a religious out-
look and the Turkish religious TV channel are promoting Islamic ideology
in Azerbaijan. The religious channel regularly broadcasts documentary-
style programmes on the topic of miracles in the Muslim world and pop-
ular serials that depict salvation through religious faith. Nigar seemed
particularly burdened with the notion of sin, gunah, and the struggle to
absolve oneself from it. Today in Azerbaijan, she told me, there are too
many people who don’t care about the welfare of others and only think
about their own pockets and their families; the fear of Allah is missing
among them. When she discovered that I did not practise Islam, the reli-
gion I was born into, she kept asking me: ‘but aren’t you afraid of
ghiyamet?’ She went on to tell me that she had felt lighter and happier as
a person since she started performing the namaz regularly. 
Nigar’s deep-rooted fear of Allah was part of the belief system that had
never been eroded from the hearts and minds of Azerbaijani Muslims liv-
ing under the veneer of atheism. The strength of this feeling was also
reflected in the survey of religious following among the youth (men-
tioned earlier) in which 80 percent of the respondents had a strong belief
in God, and only 2 percent professed to be atheist.
For Azeri youth today, subject to the global rise of Islam and prolifera-
tion of Islamist movements, the atheism of the Soviet era is associated
with their parents’ generation. Paradoxically, today’s greater mobility and
the intrusion of western youth culture encouraging autonomy and indi-
viduality may be the driving forces behind the rebellion by those young
educated women who adopt the veil against their parents’ wishes. For the
middle-generation Azeri women, however, some of whom have also
adopted new veiling as part of their strict observance of Islam, the moti-
vation may be in their need to find solace at times of crisis in life and to
face the challenges of the post-Soviet era of economic and social insecuri-
ties. This became clear in a focus group discussion I held with members
of a religiously devout group, the Al Zahra Women’s Association. A self-
funded, independent organization with 2500 members, mostly university
educated, it was registered as a religious charity in 1998. The founder of
the group, a former member of the Azerbaijan Women’s Association
(AWA; successor to the old Zhensoviet) is in her fifties, and from an old
religious family. I have known her well since my involvement with the
AWA in 1994–5. Following a number of trips to Iran in the early and mid-
1990s, she decided to take up veiling in 1998.
At my meeting with some of the core members of the Al Zahra group,
there were nine women present, all of them veiled. They ranged in age
from mid-forties to late fifties, all professional women who were either in
early retirement, or unemployed.10 Among them there were a number of
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teachers, accountants, administrators, a chemist and a painter. Their
accounts of what had inspired their new found religiosity revealed the
passage of a particularly difficult time in their life, such as bereavement
or serious ill health, just prior to their conversion. The most dramatic case
was that of an Azeri-Russian former teacher who had joined the group
following the murder of her 18-year-old daughter. The feelings of love
and reassurance she had received from reading the Koran and from the
group members had helped her survive the tragedy.
For most of the women in the group, I was told, the pilgrimage to Mecca,
or Mashad, had been the defining moment in their new religious zeal and
observance of the hijab. All the women spoke of muhabbat (love) as their great
gain in their new way of life. Some of the women began to cry as they spoke
of their recent spiritual enlightenment. They were also very keen to speak of
the bond they had formed as members of their group, helping and support-
ing each other, emotionally, as well as materially. ‘We are closer than sisters’,
a number of them stressed to me. For these women, as for those in the case
of Kyrgyzstan I have discussed elsewhere (Heyat, 2004), the sense of shared
problems and connectedness in the face of post-Soviet upheavals seemed to
be a source of empowerment, confirming their allegiance to the ideology of
the group and its requisite practices.
On the question of women’s rights under Islam, however, the group did
not seem very willing to engage in debate. When I mentioned the issue of
polygamy, two of the women simply stated that they would seek a
divorce if they found out that their husband was engaging in a serious
relationship with another woman. One of the women mentioned that in
Azerbaijan a man cannot marry two women and after a divorce, custody
of children is usually given to the mother. Another one claimed that
according to the Koran a man has to obtain his wife’s permission to marry
a second wife. The founder of the group then began to talk about the com-
plexities involved in Sharia law and that it was open to discussion and
debate. ‘We have our laws, the civil laws, and we don’t want them
changed. Sharia can only be applied in a truly Islamic state’, was her final
assessment, with which other women in the group seemed to concur.
Ignorance of discriminations in Sharia law was also common among
the newly veiled young women I had discussions with. They seemed a lit-
tle baffled and surprised when I pointed out some of the gross inequali-
ties women would be subjected to under Sharia law. But they did not
seem particularly concerned. When I asked Yasmin, for example, what
would she do if her husband wanted to exercise his Islamic right to take
a second wife, she simply said ‘I would divorce him’. She seemed to take
it for granted that under Azerbaijani law a woman had as much right as
a man to petition for divorce on grounds of incompatibility, and she
would automatically be awarded the custody of her young son. On the
question of imposed male authority, however, this was an element of their
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ethnic/national culture that most Azeri women did not challenge vocally,
but managed to accommodate their own wishes and demands despite it.
The ambiguities and contradictions in Soviet Azeri culture with regard to
femininity and gender relations had facilitated women’s agency and
offered a degree of empowerment while retaining male superiority in
public discourse and in gender relations at a formal level (Heyat, 2002:
219). Women could do and did much, behind the scenes and in collabora-
tion with their close kin and female friends, yet always deferred to their
husband, father or older brother’s authority (Tohidi, 1996, 1997). For
example, when I brought up the issue of male authority in Islam with
Nigar, the young doctor, she told me quite bluntly: ‘If I get ready to go out
and just before leaving the house my husband says to me “Stay in the
house, don’t leave”, I will obey him and not go out.’ When I asked her
what would be his response if she asked the same of him, she hesitated
for a moment, then replied: ‘He would do the same. We respect each
other’s wishes.’ I remained sceptical, but felt that in her brief hesitation
Nigar reflected the tension between the traditional Azeri gender norms,
based on notions of male control and female submission, and her status
as a western-oriented professional woman expecting full equality. The
contradiction born of this schism, however, is very rarely articulated in
public discourse in Azerbaijan.
Harris (2004), in her analysis of gender identity and performance in
Tajikistan (a society culturally similar to Azerbaijan), makes the argument
for a ‘variant gender performance’ to explain women’s intentional projection
of an image of submission to male authority to conform to Tajik society’s
gender norms, and thus gain social approval. But she maintains that gender
identities and performances are never fully internalized. They are only
assumed to suit the circumstance, like the donning of a Greek mask (Harris,
2004: 21). This may be too positivistic an interpretation of women’s behav-
iour, when in fact every individual in these formerly Soviet Muslim societies
was subject to observing sets of dualities (official/unofficial, and
inner/outer self) in their speech and behaviour. These were governed by
strong rules of deference and social hierarchy emanating from their ethnic
cultures, and the need for concealment in a secretive society. Today, one can
see how in the light of the insincerities of the Soviet culture and the complex-
ities born of the dualisms that governed their society, the young Azeris are
attracted by the image of simplicity, honesty and purity projected through
the religious groups’ teachings, whether Christian or Muslim.
CONCLUSION
In Azerbaijan, the economic, social and political upheavals following
the breakdown of the Soviet system have been unfolding in the era of
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globalization. As elsewhere in many Third World countries, a prominent
feature of the latter has been the increasing wealth gap and inequality of
access to western know-how and languages among social groups, and
between centre and periphery (Heyat, 2006). Baku has thus become a
magnet for employment, business and educational opportunities in the
country, attracting large numbers of rural migrants with more conservative
social and cultural mores. It is also a place where there is greater prevalence
of sexual permissiveness and a more acute contrast in wealth and poverty.
Given the greater freedom of association in the city, it has offered fertile
ground for foreign and emerging local Islamist groups to operate and pub-
licize their message of salvation through personal piety. While a small
minority of the Azeri population have turned to Christian churches and
other denominations, the majority have reaffirmed their Muslim identity
and taken interest in Islamic beliefs and practices, influenced by religious
knowledge emanating from Iran, Turkey and the Arab states.
A visible and poignant consequence of the rise of Islam among Azeri
women has been the adoption of the veil, in contrast to a long history of
attempts at women’s emancipation and unveiling under the Soviet
regime. Their motivation for this may be diverse, ranging from peer pres-
sure, to finding solace and support among fellow-believers, or simply due
to ideological conviction. More often though, it is a combination of these.
Nevertheless, globalizing influences that underline this relate to the phe-
nomenon of new veiling in many Muslim countries around the world.
The veil, in its modern, non-traditional form and usage has acquired sym-
bolic meaning that signifies women as bearers of national identity and
moral standards, expressing their protest against western consumerist
culture. Furthermore, it has given individual women a degree of agency
and empowered them in their public presence. In Azerbaijan, however,
there is a more complex process at play.
During the 20th century, despite certain male-biased, patriarchal fea-
tures of the ethnic Azeri culture, women gained societal acceptance of
their public presence and equal rights in education, employment and
under the law. The newly veiled women in Baku are not unaware of their
present advantageous position, even if they take it all for granted. They
do not want to turn the clock back. The phenomenon here has a genera-
tional dimension. The youth are more easily influenced by globalized
Islamist movements targeting the young through the internet, television
and the news media. For young women, distanced from the atheism and
anti-veil outlook of their parents and grandparents’ generations, the veil
signifies rebellion against establishment and a protest at the rampant cor-
ruption and gross inequalities in their country. They are attracted by the
messages of sincerity and honesty imbedded in the religious worldview,
in contrast with the culture of concealment and the dualistic presentation
of the self that dominated the lives of former generations.
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What is problematic in all this is the fact that a notion of ‘natural’ dif-
ference between men and women underlines Islamic social order, and
designates different roles for men and women. In this worldview, also
publicized through Islamist publications and websites in Azerbaijan,
female sexuality is deemed as dangerous and damaging to the social
order, and the veil is considered an essential means of its suppression
through the control of the female body and the imposition of strict moral
codes on women. For Azeri women, the adoption of the veil, though ini-
tially and in some respect liberating, in the long run confirms their social
submission to ethnic and religious norms that are inimical to their inde-
pendence and empowerment. Although at present the state in Azerbaijan
is strictly secular, the growth of Islamism and the deepening ideological
divisions in the country, along the lines in Turkey, may endanger the sec-
ular foundation of the state. The challenge for Azeri women in future
years will be to safeguard their gains of the past and build on these for a
more equitable future.
NOTES
1. This statue was erected in 1930 to commemorate the murder of an Azeri
woman by her father outraged at her unveiling. It was a culmination of pun-
ishments, harassments and even murders of unveiled women in Baku in the
late 1920s, in response to the unveiling campaign by the Communist Party
(Heyat, 2002: 131).
2. These are government estimates provided by the Azerbaijan International
Religious Freedom Report 2006, released by Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, US Department of State; at: www.today.az/news/society/
30286.html
3. Among the practising respondents, two-thirds were Shi’a and one-third
Sunni. The survey was carried out jointly by the Centre for Research on
Religion, and Republican Youth Movement, found in the islam.az website, at:
www.islam.az/az/modules/news/article.php?storyid=26
4. These take place during the holy month of Muharram, that peaks on the day
of Ashura, commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Husain, the grandson of
Prophet Muhammad, and also on the occasion of the martyrdom of his
father, Imam Ali, the fourth Khalif after the Prophet.
5. A report of the clashes in Nardaran, traditionally one of the most religious
villages around Baku, can be found at: religion.rus.ru/event/20020625html
6. For a full discussion on the Islamic following in Azerbaijan see the report
‘Islamic and Ethnic Identities: Emerging Tendencies in Azerbaijan’; at:
www.osce.org/item/23087.html
7. The statements attributed to Gamet Suleymanov are taken from an interview
I conducted with him at the Abu Bakr mosque in June 2007.
8. In the past few years, young women in large cities such as Tehran and
Karaj are wearing minimal size scarves, body hugging tunics, well above
the knee, mid-calf trousers and heavy makeup. The regime’s intermittent
campaigns of warnings, harassment and punishment have so far proved
unsuccessful.
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9. The system of corruption in Azerbaijan has become more widespread since
the breakup of the Soviet Union. In the field of employment in the public sec-
tor, for example, to get a professional job, it is often the case that in the
absence of strong personal connections, substantial bribes have to be paid to
the chief of the organization concerned.
10. Asian Development Bank’s ‘Azerbaijan: Country Gender Assessment’
report, December 2005, indicates a much lower level of economic activity
among women (59.5 percent), compared to men (83.6 percent).
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